Showing posts with label medieval. Show all posts
Showing posts with label medieval. Show all posts

Monday, December 21, 2020

Why the Hate? The Invention of Race in the European Middle Ages, and Race, Racism, and Premodern Critical Race Studies Today

by Geraldine Heng


The function, the very serious function of racism is distraction. It keeps you from doing your work.  It keeps you explaining, over and over again, your reason for being…. There will always be one more thing [to explain].



An extraordinary thing happened in the field of critical race studies this fall. A 46-page book review of my 2018 Cambridge University Press book, The Invention of Race in the European Middle Ages, appeared in the journal Medieval Encounters. The journal called the 46-page opus a “review essay,” though the review did not treat any other books or any larger subjects, as review essays do: it was just a sustained condemnation of a single book, mine. 

As I sought to understand the 46-page hatchet job, it slowly became clear that there were key issues at stake: issues involving what colleagues of color called “white privilege,” which facilitates attacks on scholars of color; the status and legitimacy of critical race analysis in premodern studies today; the vulnerability of junior scholars who want to undertake new work on race; and what race scholarship and pedagogy might look like in the foreseeable future. This essay is an attempt to address as many of these issues as possible.

First, the book review: written by an S. J. Pearce, the 46-page opus condemns Invention of Race on the basis of one chapter (my book has seven chapters and an introduction, and is 504 pages long), plus some sporadic sniping about features in another chapter. But that one chapter is so bad, the reviewer concluded, the entire book has to go. It can’t be improved, revised, or have a second edition: no, Invention of Race needs to be erased.

What was so terrible about this one chapter that the whole book must be canceled? For those who haven’t read it, Invention of Race makes a case for how critical race analysis is pertinent to the study of the premodern past, and sustains its argument through studies on Jews, Muslims, Africans, Native Americans, Mongols, and the Romani as key examples.  

The reviewer zeroed in on Chapter 2, which describes how the intensity, persistence, and comprehensiveness of state, church, and popular apparatuses marshaled against Jews in England produced England as the first de facto racial state in the history of the West.  

Astonishingly, the reviewer damned the chapter through an extraordinary misrepresentation of Chapter 2’s archive and methods.  

She claimed that, by using the archives of state, church, and popular opinion in medieval England to critiquestate, church, and popular actions against Jews—and not, say, Jewish archives—I was performing an inquisitorial, anti-Semitic, colonizing act. My chapter’s “over-reliance on the language of the Church and the English state” means that I “ally [my]self with the medieval Christian perspective of [my] sources” (p. 163).  

Actually, the chapter critiquing the atrocities of English antisemitism uses the same archive used by decades of scholars, Jewish and non-Jewish alike, working on Anglo-Jewry—whether they are historians like Robert Stacey, Patricia Skinner, Joe Hillaby, and scores of others; or literary scholars like Anthony Bale, Kathy Lavezzo, Lindsay Kaplan, and a dozen others; or art historians like Asa Mittman, Deborah Strickland, and more. It’s a well-established scholarly tradition to critique England’s antisemitism through England’s state, church, and cultural archives on Jews.[1]

Why doesn’t Pearce damn the many scholars who’ve worked in that tradition also as inquisitors, anti- Semites, and colonialists? How come their work isn’t “borderline unusable,” and “cannot be trusted” (p.160 n.37)? What’s the difference between them and me? This was perplexing.

But one clue is that the other scholars who have shared the same archive are white. I am not.  My trifecta in scholarly vulnerability is plain to see: Not white, not male, not native-born. Just a formerly- colonized subject from the old British Empire, now accused of colonialism herself. The perfect outsider and scapegoat for everything you hate.

So, here’s one of many reasons for writing this essay: to tell young medievalists of color, who have watched with pain and horror as a senior woman of color is publicly savaged in print and on social media, not to be intimidated into fearing to attempt new work on race just because they, too, might be savagedThis essay is dedicated to them.[2]

 

Outsiders and Insiders: The Politics of Race in Scholarship on England’s Jews


More, later, about the hate. Next: why do scholars of England’s Jews—historians, literary scholars, and art historians, Jewish and non-Jewish alike—all use state and church archives?  Is this a plot to replace Jewish historiography with English historiography, as Pearce claims? 


Everyone who studies Anglo-Jewry knows the answer, but Suzanne Bartlet and Patricia Skinner say it best: “Almost all that we know derives from sources produced by non-Jews, and much of what we know comes specifically from the judicial and fiscal records generated by England’s precociously bureaucratized government” (Licoricia of Winchester, p.5). This is a finely exact description of the available archive.


Medieval England simply doesn’t have a rich plethora of Jewish-authored archives. Again, Bartlet and Skinner put it succinctly: “Ultimately, the voices we hear of Jews in medieval England are filtered through non-Jewish, and sometimes overtly hostile, sources” (Licoricia of Winchester, p.10).  In fact, England’s governmentality, surveillance, and control of its Jewish population, as demonstrated in those sources, are so intensive and totalizing, it’s not difficult to argue for England’s characterization as a racial state.[3]


Does Pearce know any of this? Apparently not. She’s not a scholar of Anglo-Jewry. Her specialization, and area of interest, is “the Hebrew and Arabic literature of Iberia.”


Invention of Race has won four book prizes, sold thousands of copies, and has been reviewed a dozen times, with virtually every reviewer possessing clear reviewing credentials for addressing the book—by virtue of their familiarity with critical theories of race, or previous scholarship on medieval race, or specialization in the countries, histories, and literatures treated in the book.  


By contrast, Pearce, lacking credentials in critical theory, or scholarship on race, or knowledge of the histories, literatures, and cultures of medieval England (cf. Iberia), substitutes a long teaching vignette (six printed pages) to fill the lacuna, as her credential for reviewing a chapter on critical race in England.  


Pearce’s vignette claims she teaches students about compassion. Yet, despite the vaunt about teaching compassion, the review is devoid of any of the usual professional respect common among academic colleagues, let alone compassion.  


Instead, the tone of Pearce’s review is riddled with condescension, ridicule, and name-calling.  My chapter is “a master class in how not to write” (p.154)—an insult most of us would not inflict on an 18-year-old attempting her first freshman composition, let alone address to a colleague. I am jeered at as an inquisitor (p.145, ff.) and likened to a magpie (p.177)—a thieving bird, we note, that steals shiny junk, a mean bird notorious for its loud, idle chatter.  


Loftily, she stands as accuser, testifier, and judge: to bear “witness,” she says, to my magpie behavior with her “academic mesirah” (p.181) that will “short-stop” the “neo-colonial, neo-Orientalist discourse” (p.182) that is my book.   

 

So, Why the Hate? Critical Race Theory Today, and the European Middle Ages

 

Why would anyone produce a 46-page screed of such vitriol? 


In addition to my not-whiteness, another difference separates me from the white scholars who have used the same medieval archive. The conceptual scaffold of my book, and its interpretive practices, are informed by a background in critical race theory (CRT)—or more accurately, critical race theories, since there is a spectrum of theories, and more than a single genealogy of critical scholarship on race.  


In the past, critical race theories have maintained that race and racisms began only in the modern era—in tandem with, or resulting from, the rise of capitalism, or chattel slavery, or imperialism and colonialism, or class struggle and social war; or bourgeois hegemony, the rise of nations and nationalisms, modern state apparatuses, globalization and transnationalism, or any number of other constitutive factors.  


By contrast, Invention of Race (and my earlier publications) make/s a sustained argument for the existence of race and racisms in the deep European past, before the modern eras, and before there was a vocabulary of race to name racial phenomena, institutions, laws, and practices for what they were.[4]  


The book is thus not only an intervention in scholarship on the European Middle Ages; it is also an intervention in critical race scholarship. This is why Invention of Race is used today not only by medievalists, but also by modernists teaching critical theories of race. 


For medievalists today, the subject of premodern race is sometimes confusing.  Some are eager to enter the new conversations on medieval race. Others are genuinely puzzled about how the scholarship today differs from earlier scholarship.  I list below some useful books to consult, but there is one simple, primary thing to remember.


The word critical, here, in the study of premodern race marks an important watershed—it marks the difference between the premodern race studies of the past, and the premodern critical race studies undertaken today. Critique is involved in the latter, but was often missing from the former.  


Premodern critical race studies doesn’t just concern itself with marshaling descriptions of race, or compiling taxonomies of race, or producing summations of race (of the kind Pearce might approve, for instance), but sustains the critical analysis of race in the European Middle Ages.[5]


Critical race scholarship on premodernity analyzes the sources, institutions, infrastructures, practices, technologies, and dynamics of race and racialization, in order critically to assess their ethical, political, and epistemological consequences and impacts.  


My old friend Margo Hendricks puts it her way, when she distinguishes premodern race studies (PRS) from premodern critical race studies (PCRS), in her keynote for the RaceB4Race conference at the Folger Institute last year, and a forthcoming article in New Literary History:


Premodern race studies, in my opinion, is fundamentally written by and for white academics….scholars whose publication history shows no attention to “race” have suddenly become experts….PRS assumes no foundational work to the study of race exists….If these scholars recognize the pre-existence of a cohort of Black, Brown, and Indigenous scholars working on the subject, this pre-existence is most often relegated to a footnote entry surrounded by whiteness.  Or worse, this body of scholarship is ignored.

 

Or they might call for a scholar-of-color’s book to be canceled, as Pearce the new “expert” does. Thanks to Margo, and other colleagues of color, I’ve come to understand that this is what white privilege means—the right to bury, ignore, or cancel the work of scholars of color with impunity.[6]  


No scholar of color, however senior, is immune from such treatment—especially if they perform “foundational work” in the critical study of race, as Margo Hendricks notes.  


After all, we’ve seen critical race theory that is trained on our own time attacked by those occupying the highest rungs of political power: President Donald Trump in the US, and Ministers in the House of Commons in the UK. Given such attacks, why wouldn’t intellectual conservatives in the academy also seize the opportunity to attack the critical analysis of race in premodernity?


Of course they would, and they have. For instance: the people who run the Mediterranean Seminar made Pearce’s book review their October 2020 article of the month, claiming that the race analysis in my book is a “flattening” of religion and ethnicity; praised her review; offered Pearce more space for further words of attack; and distributed it to their membership list.[7]  


Early-career medievalists of color have also seen their work censored. An anonymous reviewer for a university press told an untenured medievalist of color—an assistant professor—that if she wants her book for tenure to be published, she must take out every mention of race. Another junior medievalist of color had her article on race rejected out of hand at a journal by yet another anonymous reviewer.


Such hostility to critical race analysis in premodern studies is vicious, but not surprising. Vicious, because nobody is demanding that every medievalist must work on critical race. The right to perform critical race scholarship doesn’t force every medievalist to undertake critical race analysis. All that’s asked for is the freedom to choose one’s own scholarship.


For medievalists who believe that to avoid critical race analysis is to sanitize what they see in their archive, surely the right to perform scholarship of their choice should not, ethically and politically, be denied them? 


Must new forms of scholarship that many consider valuable and want to undertake be prevented, attacked, or censored, just to appease those who want to conserve some old ways—their old ways—of doing things? What gives them the right to place a stranglehold on the future?  

 

What the Past Teaches Us about the Future: Feminism, Queer Theory, Critical Sexuality Studies


For those who want to undertake the new work on premodern race, here’s a reminder: feminism, queer theory, and critical sexuality studies also met with resistance in their early days. The hostility of those who want to conserve is thus not surprising: some may remember the harsh critiques levelled at John Boswell, when his Christianity, Social Tolerance, and Homosexuality: Gay People in Western Europe from the Beginning of the Christian Era to the Fourteenth Century first appeared in 1980, four decades ago. Four decades from now, critical race scholarship on medieval Europe may be as commonplace as queer theory, critical sexuality studies, and feminisms are today.  


Because it really isn’t possible to turn the clock back. There are now six full-length monographs on race in the European Middle Ages, not to mention PhD dissertations.  


In addition to my book, there’s Lynn Ramey’s Black Legacies: Race and the European Middle Ages, Cord Whitaker’s Black Metaphors: How Modern Racism Emerged from Medieval Race-Thinking, Matthew Vernon’s The Black Middle Ages: Race and the Construction of the Middle Ages, Lindsay Kaplan’s Figuring Racism in Medieval Christianity, and Roland Betancourt’s Byzantine Intersectionality: Sexuality, Gender, and Race in the Middle Ages.  


More than enough in number for someone to write a real review essay on the landscape of critical medieval race studies today.[8]


Not to mention anthologies, articles, and essays, special issues of journals, and books in the pipeline at the new University of Pennsylvania Press series, RaceB4Race: Critical Studies of the Premodern.[9] Conference panels, workshops, symposia, and whole conferences on medieval and premodern race are increasing, not decreasing.[10]


For those who consider studying religion as a matrix of race-making to be a “flattening” of religion, there are excellent studies by scholars of color who serve up trenchant responses, such as Terence Keel’s Divine Variations: How Christian Thought Became Racial Science, and Willie James Jennings’ The Christian Imagination: Theology and the Origins of Race.  


Nor is Christianity the only matrix for race-making. Michael Gomez offered richly layered arguments in his lecture on how Islamic sources on the Hamitic Curse, along with climate and zonal theories, enabled Arab and Persian authors of the 10th to the 17th centuries to racialize Black Saharan Africans and slavery in West Africa, in the Race in the Archives series organized for the Center for Medieval and Early Modern Studies at Stanford by CMEMS director Ali Yaycioglu.[11]


Critical work on medieval race is moving beyond Europe and Christendom, as more and more scholars, from distinguished senior academics of color like Mike Gomez to graduate students and early career researchers excited about new work, choose to be part of the collaborative process of co-building, and co-creating, new knowledges, new methods, and new ways of looking and thinking.[12] 


It often takes a couple of decades in medieval studies to entrench paradigm-shifting work, but perhaps the paradigms will make way more quickly this time. 


Therefore, to the early-career scholars—and others not-so-early in their careers—who are anxiously wondering if they, too, will be savaged if they undertake critical work on race; if they will be prohibited from publishing in journals and by university presses; and who fear a cancel culture initiated by hostile and powerful gate-keepers who are tenured, senior faculty, I say to you: there are some of us working hard to bend the arc of the intellectual universe slowly, but incrementally, toward greater freedom in academic publishing and academic intellectual life, so that you will have shelter and support.  


The journey may be long—though I predict, this time, it won’t take a generation to entrench the new work—but you’ll see that the company is good.

 



About the Author

Geraldine Heng
 is Perceval Professor at the University of Texas at Austin, and founder and director of the Global Middle Ages Project. In addition to her books and articles, she coedits the University of Pennsylvania Press series, RaceB4Race: Critical Studies of the Premodern, and the 40-title Cambridge University Press Elements series on The Global Middle Ages. Her MLA Options for Teaching anthology, The Global Middle Ages, and coauthored Cambridge Element, The Global Middle Ages: An Introduction, appear in 2021-2. She has begun a fifth book, Early Globalisms: The Interconnected World, 500-1500 CE.  She deeply thanks those who helped to shape this essay—for their perspectives, wisdom, and words.




[1] In fact, my book explicitly declares it stands on the shoulders of giants: the generations of scholars of Anglo-Jewry, Jewish and non-Jewish, who have shown us, over decades, how to think about this archive, and how to analyze it. One of the scholarly giants—the eminent historian of Anglo-Jewry, Bob Stacey—recently revealed that he’d been an enthusiastic anonymous reviewer of the manuscript for Cambridge. 

 

[2] Michael Gomez’s advice to all junior scholars who want to undertake critical race analysis, during his recent lecture on race in premodern Africa, bears repeating: you should power through, and do the work you want, and not let others intimidate you. In recent years, job ads for academic positions in medieval studies have increasingly listed race and early global studies as desiderata in applicants’ scholarship and teaching.  

 

[3] Jonathan Boyarin reminds me that Anglo-Jewry used to be excluded from English historiography altogether, through sanitized narratives about England’s formation. See, e.g., Colin Richmond’s “Englishness and Medieval Anglo-Jewry,” in Sheila Delany’s Chaucer and the Jews: Sources, Contexts, Meanings. More scholarship on the miniscule number of Jewish-authored documents in medieval England would be wonderful to have, even if it doesn’t pertain to race or racisms. 

 

[4] My book doesn’t call this the “origin” of race. An origin is the coming-into-being of what has never, ever, existed before. By contrast, my work—whether on race, or something else—focuses on the convergence of forces, and fields of force, that coalesce into new patterns at a particular historical moment. Inventions can thus be re-inventions-with-difference across macrohistorical time. Classicists like Denise McCoskey (Race: Antiquity and Its Legacy) show that medieval race and racisms are preceded by race and racisms in antiquity, while early modernists like Kim Hall (Things of Darkness: Economies of Race and Gender in Early Modern England) show how medieval race and racisms are succeeded by early modern race and racisms. Cedric Robinson (Black Marxism: The Making of the Black Radical Tradition) stitches together both medieval race and early modern race by theorizing racial capitalism as continuity-with-difference.

 

[5] Cord Whitaker views the implications this way, in an email exchange: “summations of race leave intact the white supremacy that has pervaded the modern academy and its practices at least since the Enlightenment.” 

 

[6] “Pearce’s bibliography cites only white scholars in Jewish studies. It completely ignores William C. Jordan’s The French Monarchy and the Jews: From Philip Augustus to the Last Capetians, a famous book by a famous Black medievalist. And it condemns Invention of Race, a book by another senior medievalist of color. Draw your own conclusions from that” (Dorothy Kim, in an email exchange).

 

[7] Like Pearce, they too sloppily treat my work on race in Europe as identical to my work on early globalism, so as to indict me of the eurocentrism I devote energy to contesting in my work in critical global studies. This, despite the fact that the title of my book is The Invention of Race in the European Middle Ages, and not The Invention of Race in the Global Middle AgesYou’d think signaling that Europe is the focus of the book, with a title like that, would be enough.

 

[8] This list doesn’t even include premodernists who study antiquity, or Judaism, or Islam: from Denise McCoskey’s Race: Antiquity and Its Legacy, to Benjamin Isaac’s The Invention of Racism in Classical Antiquity, to Denise Kimber Buell’s Why This New Race, to David M. Goldenberg’s The Curse of Ham: Race and Slavery in Early Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, to Miriam Eliav-Feldon, Benjamin Isaac, and Joseph Ziegler’s The Origins of Racism in the West, among others.  

 

[9] Bloomsbury Press will publish two large anthologies on medieval race, one edited by Tom Hahn and introduced by Cord Whitaker, and the other by Dorothy Kim and Kim Coles. Dorothy Kim has also edited a special issue on medieval race for Literature Compass, and Cord Whitaker a special issue for postmedieval, both of which join Hahn’s 2001 issue of the Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies on medieval race. Kim and Michelle Sauer, members of the Medievalists of Color, are also editing the Cambridge Companion on Christianity and RaceRaceB4Race, the Penn series Ayanna Thompson and I coedit, publishes work extending from antiquity to the 18th century: monographs, anthologies, sourcebooks, and translations.  

 

[10] The RaceB4Race conferences take place twice a year for five years, thematizing premodern race and contemporary racism in the academy, and creating a community of support for scholars of color and our allies and collaborators working in early critical race studies. The recent international conference, Centring Race in History: Antiquity to the Present, organized by the International Centre on Racism, also shows how conferences are now featuring premodern race alongside modern race.

 

[11] Bruce S. Hall’s earlier A History of Race in Muslim West Africa, 1600-1960 importantly discussed the racializing of Black Saharan Africans in 13th century West Africa by Arabic- and Amazigh-speaking groups who used Islamic sources and histories. Gomez’s important new work theorizes the racialization of Black Saharan slavery, and how climate and zonal theories became part of the racializing matrix of religion.

 

[12] In that spirit of co-creation, Jonathan Hsy’s Antiracist Medievalisms: “Yellow Peril” to Black Lives Matter examines “how communities of color and Jewish diaspora communities have long acted in solidarity against global white Christian supremacy” (Hsy).



Thursday, March 24, 2016

Language Deprivation II: Past Babel and the Communal Care of Culture

by KARL STEEL

Solothurn history Bible 36v
Part I: Babel
[let me take this reference to BABEL to start off this post (4,000 words!) to call for donations to the BABEL Working Group, surely a communal luxury if ever there was one]
The myth of the existence of a single originary language dates at least to the Biblical story of Babel (Genesis 11:1-9). From very early on, commentators on both this story and that of Adam naming the animals concluded that this first language was Hebrew. For example, the apocryphal book of Jubilees, 12:25-26, has an angel teaching Abraham what it calls this "tongue of the creation." There are few outliers: some Muslim writers – al-ṬabarÄ« and al-Ya'qubi – proposed Syriac as the first tongue, as did the twelfth-century Syriac patriarch Michael. And one first-century Jewish philosopher, Philo of Alexandria, includes an astonishing story, unique in the commentarial tradition, about the animals’ own Babel Tower. Once, all animals had spoken one language, until they had the audacity to ask for the immortality they believed the snake already enjoyed: God smote them for their pride, and they fell into mutual incomprehension. Philo does not believe it ("this also, as they say, is a fabulous story"), yet here it is nonetheless.
Christian exegesis on Babel tends concern itself with the plural verbs of Genesis 1:7 ("let us go down {descendamus} and confuse {confundamus}"), which demonstrate, they say, the existence of the Trinity. It often asserts — as did Remigius of Auxerre — that God did nothing new in dividing languages, but rather only divided the already existing category of language into different modes and into different forms of speaking and understanding (see also Peter Comestor): perhaps the actual creation of language, with all that implied about the creation of human reason, could happen only once; or perhaps even creation ex nihilo, of whatever sort, could happen only once; perhaps the divine imprimatur could not be granted to more than one language; or, finally, perhaps exegetes recoiled from imagining God creating a punishment.
But when they think to make an argument about the first language, Christian exegetes tend to agree with Jewish exegetes: at least from the time of Paradise up until the disruption of Babel, language was only Hebrew (eg, pseudo-Clementine Recognitions I,30; Isidore, Etymologies IX,1; and, here standing in for the twelfth century, Andrew of St Victor; see also Dante, pro I,6, and con here). Hebrew was preserved by Heber, hence "Hebrew" (Ranulf Higden and many others), which acquired its proper name only when it first had to be distinguished from other languages (Augustine City of God 16.4). Hebrew would be preserved – and here Christians distinguished themselves – because it was suitable that the language of salvation should first be proclaimed in the language through which death first entered the world (Alcuin of YorkRemigius of AuxerreAngelomus of Luxeuil). (for a thick set of further citations, Christian and Jewish, see Resnick 56-59).
Interestingly, the twelfth-century Maurice of [the Yorkshire Augustinian priory of] Kirkham (h/t) declared that since English had so few case endings, it was the closest language to Hebrew (235). While this error suggests something about the late twelfth-century Yorkshire perception of the relative complexity of English and French - England's other dominant tongue - I also have to wonder whether Maurice therefore believed English to be the next-closest language to the language of paradise. One is – or I am, anyway – inevitably reminded of Jan van Gorp (d. 1572), who used Herodotus’s Psamtik story to declare the supposedly Phrygian "bekkos" the same word as the Brabantian "becker" (baker), which proved the antiquity, and hence nobility, of the language of Antwerp (this is why, some of his critics claimed, that he took on the absurd name Goropius Becanus; thanks!, but cf). From Phrygian to Flemish, a conclusion that only seems to be sillier than claims about Hebrew.
Back to Babel: the most influential Christian exegete of the Middle Ages had other fish to fry. Like others, Augustine was bothered by the apparent contradiction between Genesis 11 and the several languages spoken by the Noah’s several sons in Genesis 10:5, 20, and 31: how and when did languages actually diversify (and, he might have asked, was the dispersal over the earth a blessing ("be fruitful and multiply") or a curse?). Augustine’s  Questions on the Heptateuch deals with one of these problems by proposing that the Babel story must be a flashback (in Latin; in French).
But on the topic of the original language, Augustine tends to be agnostic. While his City of God, cited above, does not deviate from the general trends of exegesis, his Literal Interpretation of Genesis allows only that Adam’s language, whatever it might have been (quaecumque autem illa lingua fuerit), could have survived to the present. His anti-Manichaean Genesis commentary proposes that God might have divided light from darkness by speaking Hebrew, Greek, or Latin, or some other language, but, in fact, "all these expressions," fiat lux and the like, "are adopted to our intellect….For with God there is pure intellect, without the noise and diversity of languages [sine strepitu et diversitate linguarum]."
Part II: (Not Only) Homo Infans
For those who really wanted to know, something more than speculation was needed. There had to be a test, and this test wondered about children, because they routinely demonstrate the transition from speechlessness to language. Isidore of Seville’s Etymologies X.ii.9 correctly derives the Latin word "infans" from a combination of the negating prefix "in" and the present participle “fans” of the deponent verb "fari," to speak. An infant is a speechless human. But this is only our first age ("homo primae aetatis"). For an infant will learn speech, "quia adhuc fari nescit" (because it does not yet know how to speak), or it will acquire the full power of speech, once its body becomes suitable for speech, as "the expression of speech is small," because it "does not yet have a full set of teeth" (nondum enim bene ordinatis dentibus).
The first thing to observe is that Isidore characterizes languages as speaking: his verbs are "fari" and "loqui," verbs that involve the audible voice (several monastic rules, for example, limited or even forbade speech, but in some cases, elaborated "signa loquendi," signs for speaking, marked as a special form of speech simply by its being allowed, and by their distinction as signa). Furthermore, simply making noise would not have been an adequate proof of being human. The noise has to be determined to be understandable; otherwise, it was as good as silence. "Muteness" is a condition associated with animality – Old French uses "mue beste" often, while Isidore himself distinguishes "pecudibus mutis" (mute livestock) from humans – so that mere noise is effectively the same as silence.
The question is how this language emerges from silence. Isidore offers two answers, and in the process two ways of being infans, laying out without resolving the crux of the problem of the origin of language. Either humans have no speech until they learn it, or they have no speech until their body suits itself for its production. In the first conception, language is secondary to us, or it is primary to us as a group, exchanged between us in ongoing acts of teaching and care; in the latter, it belongs to us as much as our teeth do. Such a rooting of language in physical capacity frustrates ideals of disembodiment so common to claims of human rationality, for if language comes out with teeth, perhaps there is no quality that supposedly makes us more than mere bodies, and certainly more than "mere animals."
For Isidore, as for most thinkers, the homo infans passes its first age and then becomes homo loquens. On this point, I prefer Agamben, for whom infancy is a key critical term (for example, here and here, from The Agamben Dictionary). I cannot endorse his notion that the inexorably alien quality of language in us uniquely thrusts humans into historicity: as Steve Mentz reminded me in comments to my last post, some whale species have "cultural lives," and as the New York Times just reported, parrots too can have dialects, which they learn while young and then pass on in turn to members of their own group. Psittacus infans.
I am far more sympathetic to Agamben's insistence that speechlessness is both the necessary condition and the hope of speech. As much as anyone can, Agamben follows Benjamin in arguing that the basic thing language communicates is communication itself [and for my summary of Agamben, I am relying on his commentators rather than his Infancy and History (1978), which has, quite frankly, aged so poorly that I just can’t imagine reading the whole thing]. To be communication, communication must have silence with it; it needs its inbuilt inadequacy. Inadequacy preserves the possibility of communication being something more than a mere back and forth transmission of needs, desires, and aims, something more than what Benjamin called "the bourgeois conception of language." Thus this inadequacy, figured as a silence within speech, holds open the possible, which we might take as standing for Agamben's Messianic suspension of the relation between sovereignty and life, and which I prefer to take, perhaps more mundanely, as a preservation of the helplessness within any social encounter, and a preservation of a extra-linguistic referentiality in any communication.
What is always in communication is the “here I am” of speech, a “here I am” whose silence is the preexistent, inescapable vulnerability of having to be somewhere, of needing to be cared for, heard, and to take up attention that might be bestowed elsewhere. This "here I am" is also a "here we are." Infancy always is within all communication and all community, and all that hope for community. Infancy is always awaiting any attempt to get to the bottom of language, culture, and our civilizations.
Part III: Deprivation and Responsibility
Agobard of Lyon's copy of Tertullian talking about Language Deprivation
Isidore has nothing to say about practical efforts to resolve these questions, nor, in fact, do many medieval writers. These date back to Herodotus and his tale of Psamtik, a powerful and long-ruling Pharaoh of the twenty-sixth dynasty around whom other equally legendary stories clustered (for example, two first-century encyclopedias, Pliny’s Natural History (XXXVI.19) and Pomponius Mela’s Chorographia (I.48I.56 in English), credit him with building the first labyrinth). Though the Egyptians reputed themselves to be the “oldest nation on earth,” others argued that the honor belongs to the Phrygians: Psamtik (whom Herodotus calls Psammetichus) wanted experimental confirmation. He commanded that two newborns taken from the common people be raised in isolation by a herdsman who was never to speak in their presence. After two years – and here I quote from an English translation of 1584, “both the little brats, sprawling at his feete, and stretching forth their handds, cryed thus: Beccos, Beccos,” which Psamtik and his advisers understood as the Phrygian word for bread. Later commentators have tended to misunderstand the importance of the story’s punchline: it is less about the origin of language than it is about ethnos: “Language,” as Margaret Thomas explains, “only entered into his plan through his assumption that he could identify the oldest people on the basis of linguistic evidence” (here): first people rather than first language.
The story had its doubters along with its misreaders, Herodotus himself included, who numbers it among the “foolish tales” repeated by the Greeks. Scholars of our own era have observed (through what perhaps may be circular reasoning) that the experimental method seems more Greek than Egyptian, and, in misguided quibble, that the word "Beccos" sounds Egyptian, not like the (mostly lost) Phrygian tongue. Modern professionals in early childhood development and linguistics – but also, dismayingly, some cultural historians – sometimes take the story literally: they trouble to dispute the validity of its design, and flaunt their conscience by condemning Psamtik’s cruelty (for some treatments, herehere ("a surprising story, if true"); "supposedly conducted"; "utterly preposterous experiment"; an "oddity of history"; disapproval of this "peculiar brand of child abuse"; and an amusing delineation of Psamtik’s logical errors, including a failure to distinguish between logos and glossa).
Medieval Europe probably didn’t know the story. Herodotus would get no Latin translation until the middle of the fifteenth century, while his Psamtik story slides into European vernaculars only with Pedro Mexia’s widely popular 1540 Silva de varia lección (and from thence, among other routes, to Claude Gruget’s 1552 French translationhere in English, from 1571). Even by first century of our era, Herodotus tended to be cited, by Cicero among others, only through intermediaries (see Félix Racine here). Until the Renaissance, there is little evidence that the story had any readers, first or second hand, despite its being from the first few books of the history, accessible even to the lazy, the harried, and the only pretentiously learned. This remains the pattern.
Quintilian may be rare exception, although he never quite sustained a a regular interest among medieval readers. He explains that "all language" [or "all speech"; omnem sermonem] comes to us by hearing:
Hence infants brought up, at the command of princes, by dumb nurses and in solitude, were destitute of the faculty of speech, though they are said to have uttered some unconnected words. (Institutes X.1)
Yet the plural "princes" and likewise plural "words" (unless he is counting Bekkos twice) suggest that even Quintilian either got the story second-hand or, less likely, that he knew of yet another ancient experiment.
Two brief allusions survive in early Christian writing. Clement of Alexandria’s Exhortation to the Greeks (the Protrepticus) argues that even if "the Phrygians are shown to be the most ancient people by the goats of the fable," neither they nor the Arcadians nor the Egyptians nor whatever ethnos we claim to be predate the divine logos, responsible for all of us. Clement’s universalist argument (cf Galatians 3:28 and Colossians 3:11) stumbles through a highly compressed allusion not to Herodotus, but rather to an ancient, confused or confusing commentary on an allusion to Herodotus in Aristophanes’s Clouds. The commentary reads that if "goats nursed the children" – which somehow transforms a human herdsman into a female goat – "it is no wonder that hearing the goat they imitated her voice, and it is a coincidence that such an expression occurs among the Phrygians." No later reader rescues Clement from this muddle: surviving medieval manuscripts of the Protepticus are exceedingly scarce, and so far as I know, it finds no Latin translator until 1551. Even now, Protepticus tends to be Clement’s least-studied work.
Around the same time, in the last decade of the second century, Tertullian’s To the Heathens (Ad Nationes) tells the story at greater length, in an argument that begins by demanding that the Romans explain what they mean by describing Christians as a "third race" (distinct from the polytheism of Romans and Greeks, and distinct as well from the Jews; this phrase, sometimes used by Christians themselves, sometimes used as an insult against them, conceptually overlaps with the idea of a "third gender"). With what can only be associative logic, Jerome then retells Herodotus’s story of Psamtik, which he probably acquired from a historical compilation (Racine 209; perhaps Varro’s lost Antiquitates rerum humanarum et divinarum): Tertullian focuses on an alternate version, only quickly summarized in Herodotus, in which it’s not a herdsman who tends the children, but a nurse whose tongue has been amputated. This is the field of battle Tertullian settles on: no one could possibly survive this wound, the removal of "the very organ of the breath of life"! Therefore – one can imagine him spitting triumphantly – the story must be false. He has nothing to say about the origin of language itself. Only one medieval manuscript of this work survives, a ninth-century copy owned by none other than the great polemicist Agobard of Lyons; but I know of no medieval quotation of or even allusion to Tertullian’s retelling of story, nor would it appear again until 1625, long after Herodotus and Psamtik made their way back into European writing.
The next historical account of the story appears an astonishing 1700 years after Herodotus, in the thirteenth-century chronicle of the Franciscan historian Salimbene di Adam, who, several decades after the events he claims to be recording, explains that Frederick II, Holy Roman Emperor, wanted to know what language children would spontaneously produce if they were never spoken to, or even dandled (blandirentur; in Latinmodern English translation here). Would it be Greek, Latin, or Arabic, or perhaps their parental language, the kind that can be acquired without training, as if – although Salimbene does not say this – one’s particular ethnic language, of whatever sort, sprang from children naturally, and that therefore there were no universal, foundational tongue? This, says Salimbene, is what Frederick wanted to learn. Instead, he learned this: without affection, babies die [since "non enim vivere possent sine aplausu et gestu et letitia faciei et blanditiis baiularum et nutricum suarum": one paraphrase here; for a brief treatment of twelfth- and thirteenth-century Latin thinking about early child care, Mary Martin McLaughlin].
Salimbene includes his story amid a set of the emperor’s other enormities. He had a scribe’s hand cut off for spelling his name "Fredericus" instead of his preferred "Fridericus"; he had a man sealed and drowned in a winecask to demonstrate that the soul dies with the body (a point Salimbene counters with a flurry of scriptural citations); and he ordered one of his men go hunting, and the other to sleep through the day, and when the hunter returned, had them both cut open to see who had better digested his food: Salimbene meant Frederick to be understood as a monster. The language deprivation experiment is just one more example of tyranny, not a historical fact in any simple sense.
It is harder to imagine a context for the final example from medieval Europe, which comes from a sixteenth-century Scottish historian, Robert Lindsey, who reports that James IV (d. 1513) had a mute woman raise two children on Inchkeith, a barren island of the Firth of Forth, North of Edinburgh. It is short enough to be quoted in full:
The king also caused tak ane dumb voman, and pat her in Inchkeith, and gave hir tuo bairnes with hir, and gart furnisch hir in all necessares thingis perteeaning to thair nourischment, desiring heirby to knaw quhat languages they had when they came to the aige of perfyte speech. Some sayes they spake guid Hebrew, but I knaw not by authoris rehearse, etc
That final, frustrating "etc" suggests that Lindsey may have had more to say about the matter. But this is it. Later, Walter Scott’s Tales of a Grandfather would scoff at Lindsey: "it is more likely they would scream like their dumb nurse, or bleat like goats and sheep on the island."
And this, combined with my blog post on Akbar and his afterlife, provides a complete record of language deprivation experiments recorded in histories, from Herodotus to the seventeenth century, in other words, 2500 years. Nearly all follow four key points from the pattern laid down by Herodotus.
  • While the children may be raised in an isolated hut or a fortified, well-guarded house, no account imagines the children denied adequate food, shelter, or clothing, only Salimbene de Adam’s account of Frederick II imagines the children denied emotional care: these stories are not presentiments of the several modern, horrific cases of children suffering in appalling confinement for years on end, alone with an uncommunicative, or crueler parent or caregiver; for the most part, all the children are deprived of is spoken communication with adults.
  • Next, the experiment always takes place out of sight of the potentate: practical reasons demand this (the children cannot hear speech, and the potentate and his court need to speak), but it also ensures that in those rare cases where the children produce spoken language, the potentate never directly witnesses language’s emergence: the mystery of whatever truth is sought (whether ethnic, linguistic, or religious) is always screened from the direct observation of the party that first concocted the experiment.
  • All involve multiple children (between two and thirty, but never just one).
  • Finally, from the perspective of the potentate, the experiment is generally a failure: the attempt to find the true origins of an ethnos or language, or an infantile (and therefore “spontaneous”) proof of the superiority of a given faith almost never occurs.
These attempts do not seek to return to the first conditions of creation. To my knowledge, stories of the creation of humans tend not to imagine humans created as infants, or even as a crowd. The Genesis tradition certainly does not begin in silence, but with (in the second creation story, in Genesis 2) God’s supervision as Adam bestows names on animals, most of whom are given no chance to speak back, and certainly no chance to name themselves.
Instead, these experiments attempt to recapitulate an experience common to all humans, all of whom begin in infancy. This experiment is both a grand experimental investigation into the early days of the human species, following the common metaphorization of history as an individual lifecycle of birth, maturity, and decline, and an attempted understanding of the origins of any given individual, who know without remembering that they acquired language some time after coming into existence.
Yet these are not experiments with individuals. That the experiment is conducted with a crowd of forcibly speechless children suggests two key contradictions at the heart of the deprivation experiment. First, they seek to discover proof that language spontaneously emerges, while also recognizing that language is a cultural product, developed and shared between people. Attempts to discover the "authentic" practice – often considered to be the same as the supposed oldest practice, equally presupposed to have kept its purity across time – tend to want practices that just happen, without predetermination. These hunts for the authentic are therefore hunts for culture that inherently distrust the secondary, considered character of culture: they want a natural culture, as if anything acquired by deliberation, desire, and choice must be inherently suspect. They therefore want the benefits of language, ethnicity, and religion, for example, without having to own up to their choice to live through their particular manifestations of these categories. They want culture without responsibility.
Second, they want the find the origin of language while also recognizing that the language’s purpose is interpersonal communication. Though the experiment wants to know if the authentic language (or ethnicity, or religion) lurks within any given child, it also knows that these practices are always practices of a group: it is impossible to imagine an ethnos or a religious community of one, for example. To put this another way, the experiment (almost always) fails because a practice that has the appearance of being inherent to a group is necessarily an emergent and developmental practice, whose feedback structure frustrates any notion of any single origin.
It is therefore not accidental that these experiments are conducted with children. It’s not simply that children are made to function as historically "prior" to adults, though the connection between child and adult that itself maintains and develops culture means that the child is, culturally speaking, secondary to the adult. It is also that children are considered to be free of culture. To deprive children of the care of culture is thus a chance to wait for culture to emerge without our having to care about it.
No wonder the experiments fail. But of course they are not whole failures. In one instance, sign language emerges, taught by “mute” nurses to the children. In another, the children acquire an ordered voice by imitating the sounds of goats. Communication happens, and it happens without the need for spoken or even a human voice. Connections are made.
And what the reveal, again, is that silence amid language. This is not the silence of failure, an aporia or impossibility at the heart of language, though of course the deprivation experiment might be taken that way. The language deprivation experiment is only partially about language, and those who take it as being about language may be overestimating the absence of silence and vulnerability in their own lives.
My preference is to take the supposed failure of the experiment as evidence of the inescapable persistence of bodies. It is a story whose truth the need for community and care. It is a story that produces another witness to the fact that the transformation of silence into any kind of voice requires someone to take the trouble to listen, to talk back, to acknowledge in any way that this too, in this moment, is someone who needs our help. What the potentate sees, finally, is what he should have known all along: his own helplessness, which cannot be overcome.